Security Advisory: CVE-2026-39293, CVE-2026-39294 and CVE-2026-39297 in jdeploy
Three vulnerabilities in shannah/jdeploy, confirmed present in version 6.1.12: XML external entity injection and OS command injection in the installer, and unpinned third-party actions in the release workflow. A private reporting channel was requested in April 2026, the issues were disclosed publicly in May 2026, and they are unfixed as of 2026-11-11.
This advisory covers three vulnerabilities in jdeploy, a deployment tool for JVM applications. A developer wraps a JAR with jdeploy, and jdeploy publishes the application through npm and produces native installers and launchers for macOS, Windows and Linux. End users download an installer; a small native launcher then fetches the packaged application and runs it.
Two of the three flaws are in jdeploy’s own installer, which reads a manifest supplied by whoever published the application. One is in the project’s release workflow and affects the build pipeline rather than the installed product. All three were verified present in version 6.1.12, the newest release at the time of writing, published 2026-11-09.
Two further CVE identifiers from the same report, CVE-2026-39295 and CVE-2026-39296, are not included here. On re-examination against the current source we could not establish an exploitable path for either, so they are deliberately omitted. The reasoning is in What we withdrew below.
Summary
| CVE | Weakness | Component | Affected | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-39293 | XML external entity injection (CWE-611) | shared/src/main/java/ca/weblite/tools/io/XMLUtil.java, and an equivalent parser in installer/src/main/java/ca/weblite/jdeploy/installer/DefaultInstallationContext.java | 0 through 6.1.12 | Unfixed |
| CVE-2026-39294 | OS command injection (CWE-78) | installer/src/main/java/ca/weblite/jdeploy/installer/Main.java | 0 through 6.1.12 | Unfixed |
| CVE-2026-39297 | Reliance on a mutable third-party reference (CWE-829) | .github/workflows/maven.yml | 0 through 6.1.12 | Unfixed |
XMLUtil.java and DefaultInstallationContext.java are byte-identical between 6.1.3, the version
named in the original report, and 6.1.12. Main.java changed only in how it derives a default
application title when none is given. The release workflow changed four times, none of which affected how its third-party
actions are referenced.
Who the attacker is, and why these still matter
For CVE-2026-39293 and CVE-2026-39294 the attacker is the publisher of a jdeploy-packaged application, and the victim is a user who installs it.
A reasonable objection is that such a user is going to run the publisher’s code anyway. These findings are reported because they sit before that point:
- Both flaws are in jdeploy’s own installer code, which is the same for every application it installs. The publisher does not write that code; the publisher supplies data, the manifest, which the installer then processes.
- CVE-2026-39293 acts when the installer reads the application manifest, which happens at startup, before the installation dialog is shown and therefore before the user has agreed to install anything.
- CVE-2026-39294 acts during installation, before the installed application has ever been launched.
CVE-2026-39297 has a different attacker: whoever controls an upstream GitHub Action used by the release workflow.
CVE-2026-39293: XML external entity injection
Component. shared/src/main/java/ca/weblite/tools/io/XMLUtil.java, lines 33 to 42. An
equivalent, separately maintained copy exists at
installer/src/main/java/ca/weblite/jdeploy/installer/DefaultInstallationContext.java, line 742.
The original report named only the first file; the second is the one the installer actually calls
for the manifest, so both are listed here.
What the code does. Both methods obtain a DocumentBuilderFactory from
DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance() and parse the supplied stream with the resulting builder, with
no further configuration. A repository-wide search for the usual hardening settings, including
disallow-doctype-decl, external entity features and FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING, returns no
results anywhere in the Java source.
Why that is a vulnerability. Java’s default DocumentBuilderFactory resolves external entity
declarations. A document that declares them can therefore cause the parser to read local files and
to issue outbound network requests, as the user running the installer.
How the input arrives. The installer parses app.xml from the application’s own install files,
fetched from the npm registry or from a GitHub release
(DefaultInstallationContext.java, lines 497 to 531 and 876 to 893). The parse happens inside
loadAppInfo (Main.java, line 1151), which runs before the installation form is displayed
(Main.java, lines 1202 to 1203). A second, independent parse of a bundle’s app.xml occurs at
DefaultInstallationContext.java, line 606.
What an attacker gains. Disclosure of local file contents and outbound requests from the victim’s machine, before the user consents to installation. The original CVE request also claimed code execution. We can find no support for that in the code, and this advisory does not make that claim.
Fix status. Unfixed in 6.1.12.
CVE-2026-39294: OS command injection
Component. installer/src/main/java/ca/weblite/jdeploy/installer/Main.java. In 6.1.12 the
relevant lines are 455 to 459 and 2134 to 2152; in 6.1.3 they are 454 and 2129 to 2147.
What the code does. The installer takes the application’s title from the title attribute of
the manifest and stores it unmodified (Main.java, lines 455 to 459;
shared/src/main/java/ca/weblite/jdeploy/app/AppInfo.java, line 1340, a plain assignment). The
title becomes the name of the installed application bundle (Main.java, lines 2033 to 2034). In the
macOS “add to dock” step, that bundle path is placed inside a double-quoted argument in a shell
command, which is written to a temporary script file and then executed (Main.java, lines 2134 to
2152).
Why that is a vulnerability. The path is interpolated into shell text without quoting or escaping, so shell metacharacters in the title are interpreted by the shell rather than treated as part of a filename. No sanitiser is applied to the title anywhere between the manifest and that command.
What an attacker needs. A macOS installation of an application whose manifest the attacker
controls, with the “add to dock” option active. That option defaults to true
(installer/src/main/java/ca/weblite/jdeploy/installer/models/InstallationSettings.java, line 22)
and is presented as a checkbox
(installer/src/main/java/ca/weblite/jdeploy/installer/views/DefaultInstallationForm.java, lines
272 to 283). The step runs after the user starts the installation.
What an attacker gains. Execution of commands of their choosing with the privileges of the installing user, from within the installer’s own flow.
Fix status. Unfixed in 6.1.12.
CVE-2026-39297: reliance on a mutable third-party reference
Component. .github/workflows/maven.yml.
What the code does. The release workflow runs on any pushed tag (lines 13 to 14 in 6.1.3) and
grants contents: read with id-token: write (lines 16 to 18). It references four actions by
mutable tag rather than by commit digest: actions/checkout@v2, actions/setup-java@v4,
actions/setup-node@v4, and the third-party apple-actions/import-codesign-certs@v1.
Why that is a vulnerability. A tag can be repointed at different code by whoever controls the
upstream repository. A workflow that resolves actions by tag therefore executes whatever that tag
names at the time the job runs. The exposure here is unusually concentrated, because the
third-party action receives the project’s macOS signing certificate and its password directly as
inputs (lines 48 to 49 in 6.1.3), and the release step’s environment carries Apple account
credentials and the keys used for Authenticode and EV code signing (lines 51 to 62). The job also
holds id-token: write, the permission npm trusted publishing relies on, and the workflow includes a
step that prepares npm for trusted publishing.
Scope. This affects jdeploy’s own build pipeline and the artifacts it signs and publishes. It is not a flaw in the installed product, and it is not equivalent in severity to the two installer flaws above. It requires the compromise of an upstream action, which is outside the vendor’s control but inside the vendor’s power to mitigate.
Fix status. Unfixed in 6.1.12. Four commits have modified this workflow since 6.1.3; none of them changed how actions are referenced.
Guidance
For users installing jdeploy-packaged applications: the installer processes publisher-supplied manifest data before you confirm installation, so the decision point that matters is whether you trust the publisher, not the installation dialog. On macOS, unchecking “add to dock” avoids the step involved in CVE-2026-39294.
For maintainers, in one line each:
- CVE-2026-39293. Configure both parsers to reject document type declarations, or at minimum disable external entities and external DTD loading, before parsing any manifest.
- CVE-2026-39294. Pass the bundle path as an argument to the command rather than building shell text from it, or reject titles containing shell metacharacters and filesystem separators at the point the manifest is read.
- CVE-2026-39297. Reference every action by full commit digest, and scope the signing secrets to a job that does not run third-party code.
Adding a SECURITY.md, or enabling GitHub Security Advisories, would give future reporters a
private channel. The repository has neither at present.
What we withdrew
Two identifiers from the original report are not published here, because re-examination against the current source did not support them.
CVE-2026-39295 concerned helper actions, where a URL or file path from the application’s
package.json is opened through the desktop handler
(installer/src/main/java/ca/weblite/jdeploy/installer/services/HelperActionExecutor.java). The
behaviour is as described in the report: there is no scheme or path allowlist. We no longer consider
it a vulnerability, because the values come only from the publisher of the application, the action
runs only when the user selects it from a menu, and opening links and files is the documented
purpose of the feature. The party who controls the input already supplies the application’s code, so
no trust boundary is crossed.
CVE-2026-39296 concerned directory traversal during archive extraction. The missing containment
check in untar is real
(shared/src/main/java/ca/weblite/tools/io/ArchiveUtil.java, lines 154 to 200), but we could not
find a path by which publisher-supplied data reaches it. The installer’s own extraction passes a
fixed .zip filename (DefaultInstallationContext.java, lines 514, 530, 876 and 891), which routes
to zip4j 2.9.1, whose extraction refuses entries resolving outside the destination. Prebuilt
bundles, which are .tar.gz on macOS and Linux, are extracted by a different code path
(installer/src/main/java/ca/weblite/jdeploy/installer/prebuilt/PrebuiltBundleDownloader.java) that
performs its own canonical-path check and rejects both tar and zip traversal; that check predates
6.1.3. untar has no caller outside ArchiveUtil.extract, whose only tar-capable caller is a class
with no references in the repository. The original report also cited GHSA-2pj2-gchf-wmw7 as a zip
slip issue in zip4j; that advisory concerns a skipped integrity check on encrypted archives
(CWE-346), not path traversal.
We have asked MITRE to reject both identifiers.
Timeline
| Date (UTC) | Event |
|---|---|
| 2026-04-01 | Pull request #453 opened against the vendor’s repository, proposing a SECURITY.md so that findings could be reported privately. No response. |
| 2026-05-28 | Five CVE identifiers assigned by MITRE under request scr2020381. |
| 2026-05-28 | The identifiers, with weakness type and affected component for each, posted publicly in the pull request thread, and the pull request closed. |
| 2026-06-22 | Follow-up to MITRE asking what was needed to publish the records. |
| 2026-11-09 | jdeploy 6.1.12 released. All three issues in this advisory verified still present. |
| 2026-11-11 | This advisory published. Three records requested for publication, two for rejection. |
No vendor response has been received at any point. No fix for any of the three issues appears in the
repository history, and the repository has never contained a SECURITY.md.
Credit
Discovered by John, maintainer of TheAuditor, using TheAuditor. Contact: info@coderealitylabs.com.
References
- Pull request thread with the original public disclosure:
https://github.com/shannah/jdeploy/pull/453 - Vendor repository:
https://github.com/shannah/jdeploy - CVE-2026-39293:
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-39293 - CVE-2026-39294:
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-39294 - CVE-2026-39297:
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-39297
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